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E-mail address: sanaa.belayachi@ulg.ac.be (S. BeThis study examined cognitive representations of routine action, through the assessment of
level of agency, in individuals with sub-clinical checking. The level of agency stems from
Action Identiﬁcation Theory [Vallacher, R. R., Wegner, D. M. (1989). Levels of personal
agency: Individual variation in action identiﬁcation. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 57, 660–671], which states that how actions are usually identiﬁed (based on
instrumental aspects or purpose) reﬂects the predominant accessibility of internal repre-
sentation (movements executed vs. goal pursued). Furthermore, this framework proposed
that altered action regulation is related to low-level of agency (i.e., action identiﬁcation at
an instrumental level). In the current study, the main result indicated that checking symp-
toms were related to a low-level of agency, that is, individuals with sub-clinical checking
identiﬁed habitual actions on the basis of instrumental aspects. This seems to indicate that
checkers may act with a lack of goal representations. The results are discussed in terms of
the role of low-level of agency in checking phenomena and related cognitive dysfunction.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is characterized by both obsessions and compulsions. Obsessions are recurrent un-
wanted intrusive thoughts or images, that particularly concern worries about contamination (e.g., becoming contaminated
by shaking somebody’s hands) or repeated doubts (e.g., concerns about having left a door unlocked). Compulsions refer to
urges to perform mental or physical acts in a repeated or stereotyped way, of which repetitive checking (e.g., checking locks,
lights and appliances) and repetitive washing (e.g., hand washing, house cleaning) are probably the most common (Rasmus-
sen & Eisen, 1994; Skoog & Skoog, 1999). Though compulsions are usually conceptualized as aimed to prevent feared harmful
situations, it seems that they can also be triggered by discomfort associated to particular sensations of incongruity or failure
(i.e., uncomfortable sensations of incorrectness, feelings of ‘‘things not being just right”, and imperfection; Coles, Frost, Heim-
berg, & Rhéaume, 2003). Interestingly, repeated actions in compulsive checking are thought to reﬂect an inability in achiev-
ing a ‘sense of task completion’ (Szechtman et al., 2001); and recent studies have related checking symptoms to ‘not just
right’ experiences (Coles et al., 2003; Tolin, Brady, & Hannan, 2008), while washing symptoms may be speciﬁcally motivated
by harm avoidance (Tolin et al., 2008).Thus, washing individuals may wash repeatedly with the abstract purpose to avoid
negative outcomes (e.g., avoiding contamination) or to achieve a particular goal (e.g., purifying the head), whereas people
with checking proneness may repeat action until they feel that it has been correctly accomplished (i.e., ‘‘just right” feelings),
regardless of goal attainment.
Consistently, several studies have suggested that checking behaviors may be speciﬁcally related to deﬁcits affecting ac-
tion processing such as action planning (e.g., van den Heuvel et al., 2005) and action monitoring (e.g., Hajcak & Simons,. All rights reserved.
layachi).
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lated to a defective use of internal representations to guide the course of action, which may lead checkers to rely on external
cues and to repeat an action until they get cues informing them that the action has been completely performed (Purcell, Mar-
uff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1998). Similarly, the postulated overactive action monitoring in checking individuals has been inter-
preted as a conﬂict between external outcomes of actions and internal representations, which may lead checkers to detect an
inconsistent ‘error signal’ and to correct actions through checking (Pitman, 1987). From this perspective, checkers’ uncon-
ventional action regulation mechanisms might stem from their defective representation of goal-directed habitual actions.
The goal-directedness of any habitual action causes that action to be mentally represented with strong links between a goal
and the instrumental features that serve it, and to be monitored according to its internal related goal (Aarts & Dijksterhuis,
2000). Such goal representations allow people to understand why they are doing what they are doing in the course of an
action and how far they are from a desired end state; on the other hand, performing habitual actions with unavailable or
irrelevant goal representations may simply disorganize the action ﬂow (Vallacher &Wegner, 1989). The present study aimed
to further explore the nature of habitual action representation in compulsive checking.
Action representation can be understood in the context of Action Identiﬁcation Theory (AIT), which proposed a frame-
work for understanding action regulation according to its representation (Vallacher & Wegner,1985, 1989). This theory pro-
posed that any behavior can be identiﬁed within a cognitive hierarchy of meanings, in which the lower-levels represent
instrumental features, and the higher-levels relate to the desired goal and outcomes of the action. The particular level at
which actions are identiﬁed is thought to reﬂect the accessibility of a particular representation (movements vs. goal). For
example, identifying the act of ‘locking the door’ as ‘putting a key in the lock’ shows that the instrumental representation
is most accessible, whereas identifying this act as ‘securing the house’ reﬂects the predominant accessibility of the goal rep-
resentation. Thus, actions are identiﬁed on the basis of a particular level of representation; higher-level action identiﬁcation
is used to perform and monitor well-practiced, routine actions or behaviors, while lower-level identiﬁcation is used to per-
form and monitor novel and recently learned actions and behaviors. When an act can be identiﬁed at both high and low-lev-
els (as in the case of habitual actions), people adopt higher (more meaningful) levels of action identiﬁcation over lower-level
ones (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987); however, whenever an act becomes complex or has been disrupted, people tend to adopt
lower-levels.
Nevertheless, Vallacher and Wegner (1989) identiﬁed individual differences in the way people understand what they are
doing according to their predominant level of action identiﬁcation (i.e., level of personal agency). The tendency to identify
action at a uniformly high-level, that is, according to its purpose and implications, refers to a high-level of agency; con-
versely, the tendency to identify action at a uniformly low-level, that is, based on its procedural aspects and motor subcom-
ponent, refers to a low-level of agency. The authors also associated the level of personal agency with distinct modes of action.
Because high-level of agency maybe related to the ability to easily adopt an appropriate level of identiﬁcation for different
types of actions, high-level agents tend to have an overall greater efﬁciency in everyday actions (e.g., less disruption, fewer
resources needed and better goal completion in everyday behaviors). In contrast, chronic low-level of action identiﬁcation
(i.e., low-level of agency) may be related to more difﬁculties in adapting representations according to action constraints,
leading people to have more disruption of the action ﬂow (e.g., emergence of new courses of action, more attention focused
on details of performance, doubts about whether the action has been completed; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989).
Furthermore, Vallacher and Wegner emphasized that the way people understand what they are doing contributes to the
way they understand themselves. Indeed, high-level identities allow one to extract intentions behind actions, which can pro-
vide meaningful depictions of the self. Conversely, low-level identities have little signiﬁcance for self-understanding, what
can make low-level agents uncertain about what they are really like. Thus, the level of personal agency may be related to
some aspects of the sense of self, such that a high-level of agency allows people to extract abstract self-knowledge from ac-
tions and thus may give them a coherent and stable understanding of themselves. A low-level of agency, on the other hand,
prevents people from doing this and may therefore have a less strong and coherent sense of self.
In sum, the level of agency refers to the preferential level at which actions are generally identiﬁed, which reﬂects the
internal representation (goal vs. movements) that is generally activated during an action, and promotes distinct modes of
action. One factor that is directly relevant to the present study is the potential for action deregulation of low-level of agency
(i.e., predominant identiﬁcation and accessibility of instrumental features). Indeed, in the absence of goal representations,
gestural representations guide actions (Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984) and chronic low-level identiﬁ-
cation is thought to promote ‘signals of inconsistency and error’, particularly during routine actions (Vallacher & Wegner,
1989). Consistently, compulsive checking has been speciﬁcally related to abnormal action regulation that may lead individ-
uals to repeat their actions (e.g., overactive action monitoring; Hajcak & Simons, 2002). Furthermore, it has been proposed
that doubts about the performance and repetition of action, which characterize checking, maybe related to the focus of
‘attention to low-level gestural units of behavior rather than to goal-related higher-level units that are normally used in ac-
tion ﬂow parsing’ (Boyer & Liénard, 2006, p. 1).
In light of this model, we could postulate that checking individuals may identify their habitual actions at a preferential
low-level. Conversely, washing patients have been reported to identify habitual action at a high-level as compared to non-
OCD controls (Dar & Katz, 2005). In their study, Dar and Katz used an item related to washing symptoms, i.e., the habitual act
of washing hands, associated with 22 identities varying in level of abstraction (11 identities representing low-level identi-
ﬁcation such as ‘I run water over my hands’ and 11 identities representing high-level identiﬁcation such as ‘I feel cleansed’),
for which patients and non-OCD controls had to indicate their degree of agreement with each identity. Their results
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than according to concrete and mechanistic details. In line with the recent suggestion according to which washing symptoms
may be speciﬁcally motivated by the goal of avoiding harm (Tolin et al., 2008), while checking symptomsmay be particularly
related to ‘‘not just right” experiences and concerns with the details of action (Coles et al., 2003; Tolin et al., 2008), our main
purpose in this study was to conﬁrm that checking symptoms are speciﬁcally associated with action identiﬁcation preferen-
tially at a low-level (i.e., low-level of agency), as compared to washing symptoms.
We will also examine the relationship between low-level of agency and altered sense of self in checking. Numerous stud-
ies have observed speciﬁc links between checking symptoms and dissociative states (e.g., Rufer, Fricke, Held, Cremer, &
Hand, 2006). Thus, we will also examine whether proneness to dissociation in checking symptoms maybe related to low-le-
vel of agency.
Those issues will be examined in sub-clinical checkers, who have been found to have clinical features and cognitive
impairments similar to those identiﬁed in checking patients (e.g., Muris, Merckelbach, & Clavan, 1997; Zermatten, Van
der Linden, Larøi, & Ceschi 2006b). This approach has the potential beneﬁt of overcoming some of the methodological prob-




One hundred and forty-seven undergraduates from the University of Liège took part in the study. The subjects were tested
in group sessions (four subjects maximum). Data from 24 participants had to be discarded as values were missing in their
questionnaires. Homogeneity statistic tests1 revealed that the mean scores for all the measures did not differ from those of the
remaining participants (ps > .53).The reported results are from the remaining 123 participants (55 males and 68 females). Their
mean age was 21.7 years (SD = 2.9 years).
2.2. Materials and procedure
Informed consent was obtained from all participants following a full explanation of the experimental procedure. Detailed
written and oral instructions explained that participants would be asked questions about different aspects of routine actions.
They were participating anonymously and on a volunteer basis. Three different questionnaires were administered to inves-
tigate the level of agency, the level of checking symptoms and the proneness to dissociation, respectively. These measures
were counterbalanced across subjects.
Behaviour Identiﬁcation Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). The BIF is an instrument designed to measure individual
differences in action identiﬁcation level across an array of routine actions (i.e., level of personal agency). Each item of the
BIF consists of an action followed by two alternatives or ‘identities’, one of which is lower and one higher in level. For each
action, participants had to choose the alternative that best describes the action they would carry out. The number of high-
level identities chosen deﬁned the subjects’ level of agency. The French version of the BIF has been validated in a previous
study intended to replicate the Vallacher and Wegner (1989) study of level of agency (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2008).
In our replication study, a 35-item version was ﬁrst created; the items were derived from the original version translated
into French, and the authors also generated some new items. In order to ensure that identities were unambiguous, 20 judges
familiar with AIT were asked to rate the level of identiﬁcation of each alternative identity. Since there were no ambiguous
identities, this 35-item form of the BIF was administered to a sample of 246 undergraduates (136 women and 110 men).
Analysis showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = 89); and the item-total correlations for these items ranged from
.46 to .78 with a mean of .43. Using a procedure similar to that adopted by Vallacher and Wegner, we used the mean item-
total correlation of .43 as the criterion for item inclusion, which reduced the instrument to 23 items. The 23 remaining items
constituted the ﬁnal French version of the BIF, which had an internal consistency of .90. In addition, an exploratory factor
analysis (principal-axis solution) revealed the existence of one factor, suggesting that the French version of the BIF is indeed
a one-dimensional scale.
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R, Foa et al., 2002). The validated French version of the OCI-R (Zermatten,
Van der Linden, Jermann, & Ceschi, 2006a) is a self-report questionnaire that consists of 18 items evaluating OCD symptoms
and is composed of six subscales (each containing three items): ‘Washing’, ‘Obsessing’, ‘Hoarding’, ‘Ordering’, ‘Checking’ and
‘Neutralizing’. The checking subscale consists of the following three items: ‘‘I check things more often than necessary”, ‘‘I
repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc.”, ‘‘I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning
them off”; and the washing subscale includes these three items: ‘‘I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to touch an object when I know it has been
touched by strangers or certain people”, ‘‘I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated”, ‘‘I
wash my hands more often and longer than necessary”. Participants were asked to determine to what extent the situation1 The homogeneity statistic test assessed the conﬁdence interval for the difference between two proportions. The procedure for obtaining such an interval is
based on the sample proportions, p1 and p2, from their respective overall populations (Easton & McColl, 1997).
Table 1
Mean scores and SDs for level of agency, dissociation and OCD measures
Dependent variables Score (SD)
Level of agency 13.7 (4.2)
Dissociation
DES absorption 30.3 (20.2)
DES depersonalization 18.4 (11.9)
DES dissociative amnesia 12.5 (12.4)
DES total score 20.4 (13.8)
OCD
OCI-R checking 3.1 (2.6)
OCI-R washing 1.7 (2.3)
OCI-R total score 17.9 (10.2)
Note: SD, standard deviation.
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4 = ‘extremely’). Total scores range from 0 to 72; the OCI-R checking and washing subscales scores both range from 0 to
12. This French version of the OCI-R has good overall psychometric properties and a factorial structure that is identical to
that observed in Foa et al.’s (2002) original English version (Zermatten et al., 2006a).
Dissociative Experience Scale-II (DES, Carlson & Putnam, 1993). The validated French version of the DES (Darves-Bornoz,
Degiovanni, & Gaillard, 1999) is a 28-item self-report instrument in which subjects are asked to answer questions by mark-
ing a horizontal line (with 0% of the time on the left and 100% of the time on the right) to show how often the dissociative
events happen. Three forms of dissociation can be measured with the DES: ‘Absorption’ (i.e., narrowing or expanding the
focus of attention), ‘Depersonalization/Derealization’ (i.e., respectively, a loss of sense of self and a loss of sense of reality)
and ‘Dissociative amnesia’ (i.e., loss of autobiographical memory). Mean scores for the three subscales and the entire scale
range from 0 to 100. This French version of the DES has good overall psychometric properties and a factorial structure that is
similar to that observed in Carlson and Putnam (1993) original English version (Darves-Bornoz et al., 1999).
3. Results
Cronbach’s alphas indicated good internal consistency for the level of agency (BIF: .89), OCD measures (OCI-R total score:
.85; checking: .76; washing: .75),2 and dissociation measures (DES total score: .93; absorption: .83; depersonalization: .81; dis-
sociative amnesia: .84). The sample means scores for all these measures are shown in Table 1.
A homogeneity statistic test conﬁrmed that the mean score on the BIF obtained in this study (M = 13.7; SD = 4.2) did not
differ from that observed in a sample of 246 undergraduates in the Belayachi and Van der Linden (2008) study (p > .5); it was
also similar to that in a heterogeneous sample of 1404 participants (undergraduates and staff faculty, gynaecological outpa-
tients, juvenile detainees) in Vallacher and Wegner’s study (p > .2). The overall DES mean score observed in this study
(M = 20.4; SD = 13.8) has been shown to be comparable, through homogeneity statistic tests, to DES means that have been
observed in an American sample of 308 college students in the Zingrone and Alvarado’s (2002) study (p > .5); as in a French
sample of 248 undergraduates in Moyano and Claudon’s (2003) study (p > .4). In addition, DES subscales scores are in agree-
ment with other studies in which absorption dissociation form (M = 30.3; SD = 20.2) is most frequently observed in the gen-
eral population (e.g., Ross, Joshi, & Currie, 1991). Mean scores for OCD dimensions showed that checking symptoms (M = 3.1;
SD = 2.6) are more frequent than washing symptoms (M = 1.7; SD = 2.3), replicating previous studies in which checking was
found to be more frequent in the general population than washing (e.g., Zermatten & Van der Linden, in press). Nevertheless,
homogeneity statistic tests revealed that checking and washing mean scores were signiﬁcantly higher in our sample than in
a French-speaking sample of 419 undergraduates in the Zermatten and Van der Linden’s (in press) study (ps < .02); whereas
OCI-R total mean score was comparable across the two studies (p > .3).
Pearson correlations were performed in order to explore associations between the measures of OCD, the level of agency
and dissociation. These analyses revealed that the level of agency was negatively correlated with the checking subscale of the
OCI-R (r = .18; p < .05), but not with the washing subscale (r = .03; p > .7). A correlation analysis conducted between the
dissociation and OCD measures revealed that they were signiﬁcantly correlated, as shown in Table 2. However, correlations
between the measures of the level of agency and dissociation failed to reach signiﬁcance (p > .4).
In order to explore the independent contribution of checking symptoms on the level of agency, with the effect of the
washing variable removed, we performed a multiple regression analysis on the level of agency, using the OCI-R checking
and washing subscale scores as independent variables. The results indicated that checking was a signiﬁcant predictor of
the level of agency (t = 2.01, p < .05, b = .20), whereas washing was not related to level of agency (t = 0.5, p < .7, b = .04).2 As only the checking and washing subscales of the OCI-R were used, we report the coefﬁcients for these subscales only.
Table 2
Pearson correlations between checking and washing subscale scores and level of agency and DES scores
OCD dimensions
Checking Washing




Dissociative amnesia .31** .18*
DES total .32** .24**
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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formed another multiple regression analysis on the three dissociative measures, using the OCI-R checking and washing sub-
scale scores as independent variables. These results indicated that checking was signiﬁcantly and speciﬁcally related to
absorption (t = 2.14, p < .04, b = .20), depersonalization (t = 3.03, p < .01, b = .28), and dissociative amnesia (t = 2.95, p < .01,
b = .27), while washing showed no independent relationship with dissociation (ps < .06).
We did not investigate the contribution of level of agency to checkers’ proneness to dissociation because level of agency
and dissociation were not correlated.
4. Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine whether checkers identify various habitual actions at a uniformly lower-level rather
than according to the related goals. The results showed that checking symptoms are speciﬁcally related to the tendency to
identify routine actions in terms of concrete mechanistic details. These results are consistent with the recent theoretical sug-
gestion that ritualized action is not connected to a representation of a goal, which is not in fact accessible (Boyer & Liénard,
2006). In the absence of goal representations, gestural representations guide actions (Wegner et al., 1984), which may lead
checking-prone individuals to be ‘task-oriented’ (i.e., focused on performance), rather than ‘goal oriented’ (i.e., focused on
implications). In other words, checkers seem to act without having any representation that allows them to understand
why they are executing certain actions. This may explain the repeated enactment of routine actions regardless of the obvious
achievement of the goal.
In addition, acting with such low-level representations in mind is thought to promote ‘signals of inconsistency and error’,
particularly during routine actions (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Numerous studies have observed the presence of inappro-
priate error-processing signals in checking individuals that may lead them to repeat their actions (e.g., overactive action
monitoring; Hajcak & Simons, 2002). Vallacher and Wegner (1989) proposed that people with low-levels of agency are more
likely to adopt alternative higher-level meanings from external cues, leading them to orient the course of action according to
the new external alternative identity by establishing a new course of action. In the AIT framework, checking individuals
might be characterized by preferential access to instrumental representations, rather than goal representations. This could
prompt them to control their actions according to situational cues, leading to the emergence of successive alternative mean-
ings that necessitate updating the current action, which may then engage them in new courses of action. This external con-
trol of action is thought to promote impulsive behaviors so that low-level agents may be more likely to respond
automatically to situational pressures, regardless of the ongoing activity (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Interestingly, OCD
symptoms have been recently related to different facets of impulsivity (Zermatten & Van der Linden, 2008). However, what
remains unclear is the nature of the psychological mechanisms speciﬁcally involved in the relationship between impulsivity
and OCD symptoms.
Another important outcome of this study is the fact that a low-level of agency is speciﬁcally related to checking, and not to
washing. It should be noted that Dar and Katz (2005) recently showed that washing symptoms were associated with a high-
level of action identiﬁcation, an association that is not observed in our study. However, Dar and Katz examined the level of
action identiﬁcation in washers by using an action speciﬁcally related to their obsessions and compulsions, namely the act
of washing their hands, whereas this was not the case in our study. In this vein, it would also be important to explore the level
at which actions related to checking symptoms (e.g., turning off the stove) are identiﬁed by checking individuals. Nonetheless,
our results are in line with previous studies in which checking and washing symptoms had different patterns of cognitive
impairments (for a review, see Muller & Roberts, 2005); supporting the idea that ‘OCD might have to be conceptualized as
a spectrum of multiple, potentially overlapping syndromes rather than a unitary nosologic entity’ (Mataix-Cols et al., 2004,
p. 1).
A secondary investigation in this study explored the links between the low-level of agency and altered sense of self in
dissociative states in compulsive checking. The results showed that checking symptoms were speciﬁcally associated with
the tendency to manifest an altered sense of self, whereas no independent relationship was found between dissociation
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was no correlation between the level of agency and dissociation, which contradicts our prediction that the presence of dis-
sociative states in compulsive checking may be related to low-level of agency. We also failed to replicate previously observed
links between level of agency and sense of self (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), though the absence of an association between
agency levels and dissociation in our study may stem from the different dimension of the self that we assessed. Indeed, Vall-
acher and Wegner related level of agency to a conceptual dimension of the self such as self-deﬁnition through personality
traits, which constitutes knowledge about the self that is not available to immediate perceptual experience (Morin & Mi-
chaud, 2007). In our study, on the other hand, we related level of agency to a phenomenal dimension of the self such as one’s
direct experience of oneself or the world. Overall, this suggests that action identiﬁcation levels may be speciﬁcally related to
abstract knowledge of the conceptual self, rather than to immediate perceptual experience of the self. Future studies should
explore the connection between low-level of agency and altered sense of self in checking individuals by using measures that
assess the conceptual dimension of the self.
Before concluding, we should emphasize that the correlational method we used prevented us from determining the nat-
ure of the relationship between low-level of agency and compulsive checking. Indeed, what remains unclear is whether low-
level of agency leads people to check their actions, or whether checking proneness may provoke a chronic low-level of action
identiﬁcation. It is possible that a lack of goal accessibility during actions may lead people to misunderstand what they have
just done and consequently to check their actions. Conversely, individuals with checking proneness may identify routine ac-
tions at a preferential low-level in order to make sure that their routine actions have been performed successfully. One way
of answering this question would be to explore the extent to which inducing low-level of action identiﬁcation may triggers
doubts about self-performed actions and checking behaviors, and the extent to which inducing checking may engender
spontaneous low-level of action identiﬁcation. Nevertheless, we assume that low-level of agency may only constitute one
of the numerous factors implicated in checking, such as anxiety, attentional focus, reality monitoring difﬁculties and poor
memory for actions (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Zermatten & Van der Linden, in press). For example, high-levels of anxiety have
been reported to lead individuals to focus attention on details, favoring local perceptual information processing (e.g., Boyer &
Liénard, 2006; Derryberry & Reed, 1998). Further studies should be conducted on compulsive checking in order to clarify the
relationships between low-level of action identiﬁcation, anxiety and low-level attentional focus. Similarly, the relationship
between low-level of identiﬁcation, difﬁculties in action memory and reality monitoring should be explored. In this prospect,
Vallacher and Wegner (1989) showed that people who identify their routine actions at a preferential low-level are more
prone to everyday memory failure and particularly to an inability to remember whether a previous intended action has been
executed (e.g., forgetting whether the light has been turned off or whether the door has been locked,. . .). Accordingly, chronic
low-level of action identiﬁcation maybe responsible for memory failure, which in turn may trigger doubts about action per-
formance and checking behaviors.
In conclusion, this study mainly highlighted the predominantly instrumental identiﬁcation of actions that may char-
acterize checkers. The results support the idea that checking individuals perform actions that are disconnected from the
goal they wish to achieve. This may explain why they have concerns about performance and doubts about the correct-
ness of their actions, and why they repeat them, even after achieving their goal. Although comparably defective action
processing has been observed in both sub-clinical and clinical checkers (Ecker & Engelkamp, 1995; Gehring, Himle, &
Nisenson, 2000; Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Zermatten et al., 2006b), the impact of chronic checking symptoms on action
identiﬁcation levels remains to be explored. Thus, future studies should examine this issue in individuals with more se-
vere obsessive-compulsive symptoms (i.e., patients with compulsive checking). Further work is also needed to see, on
the one hand whether a low-level of agency could be related to checkers’ cognitive deﬁcits (e.g., overactive action mon-
itoring) and, on the other hand, to what extent our results can be replicated with checking-related actions (e.g., turning
off the stove, locking the door).
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